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Rethinking My First Love

From the sudden stab of a sharp needle to the heart: a first love, a relationship breakdown, and why I have yet to reclaim my right to the narrative

Publication Date: 16 March 2026
Author: Ailven LIU 刘翔
All Rights Reserved

At a particular moment in Beijing I caught sight of a girl who bore an uncanny resemblance to her, accompanied by a boy I did not recognise. It may well have been nobody at all; it might simply have been a similarity of outline, of gait, of atmosphere. Yet my body did not wait for facts to be verified. In that instant it felt as though a razor-sharp needle had suddenly been plunged deep into my heart. What followed was an almost physical agony: a tightening across the chest, the centre of gravity shifting, the world seeming suddenly to reel. Everything I had believed time had buried came flooding back within a single second.

That scene itself is not complicated, yet it is sufficient to expose a truth. I have not truly completed my reckoning with that relationship. I may have resumed my life, work and daily routines in practical terms, but on a symbolic level – concerning my sense of self, my conception of love, commitment, value and fate – that relationship has never really found its place. It has embedded itself in a more hidden yet sturdier way.

This essay is therefore not intended to retell a sentimental story, nor to rehearse any facile emotional catharsis. My task is colder and harder: why did a relationship I once believed would not end collapse so completely? What types of responsibility did I and she respectively bear in that collapse? Why, three years on, can a fleeting resemblance still fell me? Why did I slide from believing ‘where there is a will there is a way’ towards a conviction that everything is arranged in some inscrutable destiny? And, perhaps most importantly, why do I continue to retain, on some level, the right to define that relationship with her rather than reclaiming it for myself?

I: The fracture of an entire life structure

Losing a person alone need not inflict pain of such duration. What makes relationships particularly hard to process is when that person has become woven into the entirety of one’s vision of the future. She was more than a lover: she formed part of my overall projection of where and how I would live, with whom I would spend my later years, and how to understand intimacy itself. At that time I conceived of love as a structure pointing directly to building a common life: mutual support, helping each other, planning together, and through practical constraints gradually creating a life that belonged to ‘us’.

Precisely because of this, the most catastrophic element was the unilateral demolition of our shared future. In my records I wrote: ‘At a stage in which we both faced infinite choices, I knew that if two people were to stay together long-term, they had to have a future negotiated together.’ That sentence represented my underlying institutional understanding of intimacy: love was an enterprise in common, not a cluster of feelings. In retrospect, these words constitute my institutional presupposition about relationships rather than an expression of emotional ethics: love is a community project, not a readily revocable affection.

She later revealed a very different doctrine: personal development trumps all; commitments are provisional; the future can be discussed but should not substantially restrict an individual’s path; when the cost of communication becomes too high, withdrawal becomes legitimate or even necessary. This doctrine is not necessarily wrong, but it is incompatible with mine. The problem is that I only realised she had switched doctrine when our relationship had already been deeply communalised.

This also explains a key phenomenon: why did I later feel she had become a completely different person? The truth is that the foundation on which she understood the relationship had changed; she herself may not have. Many of our differences and conflicts already existed, but within a communal framework they would have been taken as frictions to work through together. Once the structure shifted to one prioritising individual gain, those differences were reinterpreted as evidence of incompatibility. Our divergence did not suddenly widen; the evaluative regime had shifted.

In this sense, our relationship was hollowed out over time by a deeper institutional mismatch. No single argument or harsh word did that work. By the time the final rupture came, what appeared to be a sudden break was in fact the expression of a long-running structural split.

II: My responsibility lay in turning fear of loss into controlling harm

It would be too convenient – and shallow – to conclude that our breakup was wholly due to her altering her priorities and renouncing our shared commitments. In truth, the acceleration into toxicity was fuelled by my own behaviours when confronted with distance, instability and uncertainty, as much as by her shifting stance.

I have since acknowledged, and need to name plainly, that during that period I often spoke to her in ways that wounded, belittled, blamed and insulted, even employing techniques akin to emotional manipulation. This deserves no beautification. In a state of existential threat to my attachment, I was unable to stabilise my pain as expressions of feeling and need; I transmuted it into pressure, accusation, relentless explanation, and moral debt. Though my stated aim was to repair the relationship, my methods bore the structure of coercion – pressing her to resume the trajectory I understood as ‘right’.

The boundary between legitimate pain and manipulative harm lies in the structure of the interaction, not the intensity of emotion. To communicate distress – however fiercely – is one thing; to transform that distress into a mechanism for obliging the other to change their behaviour is quite another. When I slid into telling her she ‘didn’t care’, she ‘only used people’, she ‘had no heart’, when I invoked the things I had done for her as a kind of unspoken debt, I was employing shame and guilt as levers, not simply expressing vulnerability. My complaints thus morphed from ‘I feel hurt’ to ‘you are a problem’.

This manifested in two principal ways. First, I could not tolerate the fact that her decisions were no longer aligned to ‘us’. Consequently, I kept trying to drag her back through analysis, explanation, letters and appeals, hoping to re-enlist her in a communal enterprise. In my own mind I was working to mend something; but to someone who had ceased to participate in the same repair mechanism, these high-frequency interventions were themselves a burden. Second, I transformed my practical support during her study and application processes into an implicit moral debt: because I helped you, you should not leave. Even if I rarely said it outright, the structure implied a bond of obligation that was not freely chosen.

Thus, my principal responsibility was something more specific than a vague immaturity: under a collapsed attachment system, I transposed fear into high-pressure, invasive patterns of interaction. I wanted to protect a relationship, yet I resorted to tools that would accelerate its destruction.

III: Her responsibility lay in choosing humiliation and de-personification as the mode of departure

Leaving someone is not in itself morally illicit; anyone has the right to decide to cease a relationship. What creates ethical responsibility is the manner in which one leaves.

What cut deepest was the language and posture she employed in withdrawing. Rather than saying ‘I don’t wish to continue’, ‘we are incompatible’ or ‘I cannot sustain this’, she progressively rewrote me in ways that vacated me of personhood. My efforts were cast as worthless self-dramatics; my sincerity was compressed into petty ‘letters’ that bored and repulsed her; my existence became suffocating to her; my emotions were denied any legitimacy; everything I could offer became highly substitutable; our entire history together was recoded as a banal, universal experience any two people could have had. What might have been a process of saying no became a process of annihilating my standing as someone worth speaking to at all.

Such de-personification is cruel, and it serves clear functions. To exit from a deep investment without internal self-conflict, it helps if the other can be reframed as someone one has good reason to abandon. If one simply acknowledges, ‘I am changing my own doctrine’, one must shoulder the responsibility of having altered a commitment; it is easier to say, ‘He was never worth it’. By magnifying my faults, cancelling our past significance and positioning me as the source of her pain, she converted a choice to leave into an act of self-liberation. The more degrading the portrayal, the less room for remorse or doubt.

The better question is how to name the combination of self-preservation, anger, vengeance, rationalisation and status inversion that made humiliation her chosen method, rather than whether she was ‘bad’. Yes, she had every right to leave. But the way she left – through denying my right to be seen and rewriting me into nothingness – carries its own weight of harm that cannot be explained away as mere self-defence.

IV: The deepest wound came not from losing her, but from losing the legitimacy of our past

Many break-ups hurt, but they are not always annihilating. If both sides can still recognise the period they shared as something genuine, unique and cherished, the pain remains bound to the future: there is no ‘us’ henceforth. In my case, the worst damage lay in the revision of the past. She withdrew from a future together, and then from the very reality of what had been.

I know she had, at one point, truly loved me. This is not some myth I later invented. She told me she felt she must have done something remarkable in a previous life, that she had exhausted her fortune to meet me. We walked the streets of Qingdao like an old couple, our life skipping over youthful infatuation straight into a retired kind of peace. She spoke of driving across China when we were old, not needing wealth or splendour, only each other. Those were not fantasies; they really happened. And yet later they were recoded. She said our being together was never love, only responsibility; she recast everything I did as mere self-gratification; she reduced our unique relationship to an episode any random pair of people could duplicate. Thus I lost more than a partner: I lost a witness to that time, someone who could corroborate that it had meant anything.

This creates a particular structure of trauma: the future is gone and the past is delegitimised. One is left hanging. The moments I had believed were the most beautiful and real now seem to be contested. If she no longer acknowledges them, do they still count as real? Hence my philosophical interrogations: what does it mean to be seen in love? Is love a recognition of a person’s existence, or a valuation of their usefulness, potential, social position? If the latter, it follows that someone can enter my life intensely and yet later revoke my right even to remember it as special. If love can retract recognition in such a manner, what is its essence?

These questions may sound abstract, but they cut to the bone of modern intimacy. Many relationships are tacitly built not on unconditional affirmation of the other’s existence, but on a silent mechanism of valuation. So long as life is smooth and the relationship yields pleasure, stability and a shared prospect, this mechanism is disguised by romantic language. When conditions change, it shows itself. The abrupt cancellation of a person, to which I was subjected, forces me to confront this unspoken economy.

V: My drift towards fatalism was an anaesthetic

After this breakdown, I found myself moving from ‘where there’s a will there’s a way’ to a sense that everything happens as if arranged by fate. At first I believed this was a kind of insight, but now I see it as primarily a way to staunch psychological bleeding.

The reason is simple. To insist on human agency would mean facing relentless counterfactuals: if I had not demanded we live in the same city, if I had not expressed my insecurity so violently, if I had not weaponised affection into moral debt, would we have survived? If she had not altered her commitments, or had not rewritten our relationship after receiving an offer from Zhejiang University, might we have actually had the future we imagined? These questions are infinite. To quiet them, the mind naturally slides into fatalism: everything happened as it must; I was carried by forces beyond my control.

Fate thus becomes a temporary defence, translating personal failure into structural inevitability. Yet it comes at a price: it disarms agency. If I say it was all preordained, then the lessons of personal responsibility dissolve. This may be soothing, but it is not explanatory. A more accurate understanding is that there were significant structural constraints – distance, study destinations, diverging life paths, differences in personality, an imbalanced attachment pattern – and there were also clear human decisions. Recognising structural limits does not absolve us of the ways we worsened matters. Fatalism may dull the pain, but it cannot offer a truthful account.

VI: What keeps piercing me today is not merely her, but the version of myself she once affirmed

So why, years later, does a glimpse of someone who looks like her still cause such devastation? My conclusion is that it is less about her as an individual and more about the self that was recognised in her eyes. First loves contribute to one’s self-model, and that, more than their priority, is what makes them powerful. To be thus loved, needed, affirmed confers a basic sense: I can be seen, needed, cherished, and included in another’s future. This amounts to an ontological validation. And when the same person who conferred that validation later withdraws it, and in doing so declares me to be of no worth, what is wounded is not attachment alone. It is a deep belief about myself.

This partly explains why I went on to develop theoretical frameworks on conditional recognition versus seeing someone’s existence for its own sake, on how modern society has colonised love with a market logic, on status-sensitive performativity. On the surface I was exploring social structures; at a deeper level, I was trying to answer a personal question: if someone I believed to be deeply authentic could retract recognition so severely, what then is love? If relationships are contingent on performance, growth, position, future prospects and class anxieties, can a person ever be loved as such? These questions show the fusion of my personal trauma with social critique.

Yet, even with these analyses, there are two ways to use such theory. One is to reclaim my narrative: to say that her withdrawal says more about her values than about my worth; that she was operating under a valuation framework; that her departure reflects her story rather than my essence. The other way is to elevate my wound into philosophy while leaving her verdict intact – to suggest that her leaving proves something inherently deficient about me. For a long time I leaned towards the latter: I could criticise societal structures, yet I still implicitly accepted that she had looked through me and found me wanting.

VII: Reclaiming the narrative is not about debasing her, but about demoting her judgement to a testimony

For years I remained in a courtroom she built. She issued charges: immaturity, suffocation, uselessness, self-indulgence, substitutability, repulsiveness. I spent my inner life drafting defences: I am not those things, I was in pain, I gave so much, I had my reasons. As long as I remained absorbed in such rebuttals, I implicitly accepted her authority to judge. True sovereignty over my story requires me to leave that courtroom entirely.

This does not mean declaring her ‘evil’ or ‘cold’ while I am ‘holy’. That would still be a reaction trapped within her framework. Instead, it involves a layered distinction. I can acknowledge that certain of her criticisms of my behaviour were accurate: my high pressure, controlling tendencies, insults and intrusions would suffocate anyone. I can acknowledge that she acted partly out of her own pain and self-protection. But I must also refuse to let these acknowledgements confer upon her the right to pronounce final judgement on my being. She may offer a testimony from her perspective, but she is not the final arbiter.

This is difficult precisely because she was once my primary certifier. To detach her judgement from my worth feels like a betrayal of my own history. But closeness does not equate to truth; intimacy does not grant judicial authority. She saw many aspects of me, but she saw them through the lenses of her needs, fears, ambitions and defences. Hence her testimony is inevitably shaped. It has value, but it is not a verdict.

True narrative reclamation thus means downgrading her pronouncement from a decree to evidence. It allows me to say: yes, she was hurt; yes, I caused pain; yes, she changed and withdrew; but no, she does not define my essential worth. She is part of the story, not its whole. The relationship is a chapter, not the totality. Initial loves do not return; the innocence of young adulthood does not return; the first experience of being so confirmed and then so cancelled will not be repeated. Those unique circumstances cannot be replaced. But their unrepeatability does not prevent me from learning more accurate, more sober ways of understanding people and relationships.

VIII: What remains is not simply hurt, but a colder recognition of the age and of myself

To limit this story to personal misfortune would be to misread its significance. Yes, it is my experience; yes, it shattered me; but it also forced me to witness unsettling dimensions of contemporary life.

I have come to see that modern culture has embedded instrumental reason deep within ostensibly romantic interactions. People do not consciously treat each other as tools; nevertheless, the maintenance of relationships is increasingly subject to calculations of trajectory, position, growth rate, psychological cost and class mobility. Schooling is like this, work is like this, and relationships are rarely exempt. A person may speak tenderly and poetically when all is well, yet when core interests, paths or status differentials are triggered, the underlying logic reveals itself: is the other being regarded as an irreplaceable person, or as a re-evaluated asset? The more sophisticated the language, the more harmful the outcome can be: cruelty can be delivered through ‘rational’ terms.

Simultaneously, my own conduct was exposed. I had thought of myself as defending love, commitment and community, but under pressure I could quickly adopt the logic of dominance and leverage. I turned affection into a debt, pain into a weapon, communication into a tribunal. In other words, I employed my own forms of harm. She injured me with withdrawal and humiliation; I injured her with control and violation. These harms did not cancel each other out, but they interacted and magnified within our mismatched systems until the relationship disintegrated. By the end, one of us held the narrative high ground, and the other remained stuck.

Thus I must acknowledge: many relationships collapse because two people enacting incompatible doctrines inflict injuries that feed back into a destructive cycle. Purity on one side and rottenness on the other is the rarer case. It is not always necessary to decide which party is wholly to blame. More often, both parties commit serious mistakes under different imperatives. The challenge is to recognise these mechanisms without sliding into self-exculpation or fatalism.

IX: In conclusion, what this story means to me now

If pressed to summarise this relationship as objectively as I can, I would not call it ‘true love betrayed’ nor reduce it to ‘two youngsters mutually torturing one another’. It was a relationship that once was genuine, deep and filled with communal imagination. Under the pressures of distance, diverging life paths, unequal attachments and reversed power dynamics, it evolved into a scene of mutual harm. Eventually, it ended in a high-impact act of de-personifying severance. It neither was a fabrication nor something a mere ‘we are not compatible’ can explain away. It matters to me because it compels me to confront questions I would rather avoid: is love built on unconditional recognition of a person’s existence? Does modern intimacy submit increasingly to instrumental reason? Who do I become when my attachment system is destabilised? And when my principal witness withdraws her confirmation of me, how do I redefine myself?

That moment in Beijing – the stab like a needle – is now less of a mystery. It happened because somewhere within me she continued to hold the authority to define. Time had passed; that authority had not. As long as that authority is unrevoked, any trace that resonates with our story has the power to reopen old circuits.

Thus, this essay does not seek to elicit sympathy or to judge. It sets out to reset permissions: I acknowledge the reality of what we had and the authenticity of her earlier love. I acknowledge the real pain and the need for medical intervention that followed. I accept that I behaved in ways that caused harm. I accept that she had reasons, that she too was wounded and that her departure reflected her values. But I no longer accept her as the judge of my essence. She is a witness, not the court; a participant, not the narrator. That chapter was formative, but it will not define the entire text of my life.

It is unnecessary to declare ‘I have forgotten’, or ‘I will never trust again’. The truth is more nuanced: I was forced to relinquish certain naive beliefs, yet through that loss I have gained a more clear-eyed view. This view is not comfortable, but it returns the narrative to my own hands.